We examine how financial theory and economic principles offer guidance and predictions about the organization of investments and asset allocation decisions given the structure of taxes in estate--planning situations. We provide insight about many of the conventional approaches to estate planning and suggest how these strategies can be enhanced. For example, we show that the advantage of the reset provision by which the investor's capital gains tax bases are adjusted to the market value at the time of death is greater in the presence of individual rather than joint ownership of assets, provided that at the first death of one of the joint owners the basis is reset to an average of the date of death value and the survivor's original cost. We analyze asset location and distribution policies in the context of trusts that are outside of the taxable estate of its principal beneficiary as well as direct funds owned by the beneficiary, highlighting the interaction between estate taxation and the reset of the capital gains tax basis at death. We compare the optimal decisions for traditional tax-deferred accounts and after-tax ("Roth") IRAs.
1 For example, we show that the advantage of the reset provision by which the investor's capital gains tax bases are adjusted to the market value at the time of death is greater in the presence of individual rather than joint ownership of assets, provided that at the first death of one of the owners the basis is reset to an average of the 1 We assume throughout our analysis that the investor's marginal beneficiaries are individuals (e.g., family members) rather than charitable organizations as the planning issues and opportunities would be substantially different in the latter context. date of death value and the survivor's original cost. The option value that results is greater in the individual ownership scenario than in the case of joint ownership because of greater flexibility in the diversification opportunities after the reset at death due to greater spreading of the survivor's overall tax bases (which are the exercise prices of the investor's tax-trading options). This exploits within a portfolio-theoretic context the option-theoretic notions that a portfolio of options is more valuable than a single option on the composite portfolio and that option values are convex in the exercise price (see, e.g., Merton [1973] ). While the treatment of the basis assumed is appropriate in noncommunity property states (41 of 50 states within the United States), in the community property states the entire basis of "community property" assets is reset to the market value at the death of either owner as the full position is presumed 100% owned by each of the two marital owners.
2 Consequently, the value of the reset provision and the resulting incentive of the elderly to own equity are particularly large for "community property." However, the reset provision does not affect the titling of "community property" because the 100% reset obtains whether the asset was titled to the deceased, the survivor or jointly owned.
We also analyze asset location and distribution/contribution policies in the context of trusts that are outside of the taxable estate of its principal beneficiary as well as direct funds owned by the beneficiary. We identify optimal policies for investors with separate funds that are inside and outside the investor's taxable estate (such as the inherited funds in a "credit shelter" trust), where the funds inside the taxable estate allow reset of the tax basis at death (making equity more attractive, especially for the elderly) and the funds outside the taxable estate do not benefit from the capital gains reset. Consequently, for a sufficiently small value of wealth owned by a couple, it would be optimal to not establish a credit shelter trust (even if costless to do so) or alternatively, place only a limited amount of funds within it (because the likelihood of estate taxes at the second death is sufficiently small) and instead benefit from the reset of the capital gains bases on those assets at the second death. For investors with moderate wealth levels the value of the credit shelter trust can be less than the potential value of the reset of the tax bases at death. Our approach suggests that the amount of funding of the credit shelter trust should equate the marginal expected estate tax savings and marginal benefit from the reset provision at the second death under the risk-neutral measure at each point in time that there is a marginal funding or distribution decision between the accounts (e.g., the optimal funding or distribution choice is not at a corner). In the face of a rising estate tax exemption threshold over time, investors will find it less attractive over time to utilize the credit shelter provision in order to more fully utilize the basis reset at the second death.
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Our analysis of the initial contribution and periodic distribution decisions is one of several ways in which we examine the interaction between estate and income taxes.
Our analysis addresses the reset provision at death and asset titling such as joint vs.
individual ownership (Section 2), "credit shelter" trusts (Section 3), several insights about the value of tax-deferred investing in both traditional tax-deferred programs and Roth IRAs (Section 4), and the value and importance of borrowing in various contexts in estate 4 The potential value and impact of the reset provision at death was first highlighted in finance by the analysis of Dammon, Spatt and Zhang (2001a) in which the investor's exposure to risky securities increases with age as a consequence of the increasing value of the reset provision and the efficient tradeoff between realizing capital gains and portfolio rebalancing. The basic notion of tax-timing options and their importance to financial asset valuation was developed by Constantinides (1983 Constantinides ( , 1984 and extended by Dammon and Spatt (1996) . on each of the partner's deaths rather than just the second death (the initial exemption would be lost if all of a married individual's assets were passed directly to a spouse at death). Individual rather than joint ownership (whereby the assets would be automatically transferred to the survivor after the first death) also allows more flexibility for such "postdeath" options as (a) selecting assets for funding the "credit shelter trust" (which is an "asset location" issue looking forward), (b) exercising the potential beneficiary's option to "disclaim" some or all of his inheritance in favor of the next designated beneficiary and (c) funding the trust above the exemption amount by prepaying federal estate taxes.
Though these benefits of individual titling beyond the federal estate exemption amount are small in some circumstances and less emphasized by estate planners than the funding of the basic "credit shelter" amount, individual titling beyond the federal estate threshold offers a number of advantages with respect to "post-death" estate planning decisions (options), in addition to the "reset" treatment highlighted in the text.
Our focus in this section is upon the consequences of asset titling for capital gains rather than estate taxation. First, we observe that joint titling of assets (by which those assets directly pass to the surviving owner) is dominated from the perspective of the reset provision and the subsequent tax-trading opportunities by splitting the assets between the two individuals (and for example, passing the individual assets at death to the marital partner by either contractual instructions in the asset titling or by the individual's WILL),
provided that in the case of a jointly--titled asset, its basis is adjusted subsequent at the death of the owner dying first to a "blended basis" that reflects the average of the original acquisition cost (the surviving owner's previous basis) and the date of death value. This blended basis reflects the blended ownership situation corresponding to joint titling that prevailed prior to the death and the lack of reset directly available on the one-half of the position previously owned by the individual who survived. This leads to the same average basis at the death of one of the owners as the situation in which the assets were individually and equally owned by one of the two partners, because half of the assets are reset to the current market value due to the death of their current owner. However, the joint ownership/blended basis situation does not provide as much option value to the owner. The surviving owner would be better off retaining a low basis on half of his shares and obtaining the current market value as his basis on the other half of the shares single risky asset and a risk-free security. In this setting an increase in the investor's mortality risk profile over time or an increase in the investor's mortality risk at a given age will typically lead to greater retention and purchase of the risky security due to the reduced value of immediate diversification and the potential opportunity at death to adjust the tax basis to the market value. Similarly, if the couple has flexibility to reallocate their exposure between the individuals constituting the marital couple, then the high mortality risk investor will tend to hold relatively more of the risky position with relatively larger gains. This is illustrated by the situation in which one of the individuals has a relatively limited life expectancy, so that the couple would be oriented towards allocating exposures with substantial capital gains to the individual in poor health. 6 This discussion suggests the optimality of skewing the assets held by a couple to reflect their health circumstances and efficiently exploiting the reset provision. Of course, there often is considerable uncertainty about which of the marital partners is likely to die first, which will influence the optimal form of the division of assets, and limit the degree to which positions should be skewed in the optimal solution from a tax planning perspective. As noted previously, with a complete lack of information about relative mortalities (or identical mortality rates) the nature of the diversification benefits implies that equal splitting is optimal.
The analysis in the earlier portion of this section was based upon the assumption that the basis of jointly-titled assets would be reset at the first death of the joint owners to a blended basis equal to the average of the market value at that death and the initial acquisition cost (i.e., the average of the adjusted basis of the deceased owner and the survivor). In fact, when the owners live in a community property state (or the asset was acquired prior to 1977) the basis is fully reset to the current market value at the first death. 7 The full reset occurs whenever the asset is "community property," whether titled to the deceased, the survivor or jointly owned. Consequently, the reset provision at death does not affect optimal titling of community property. All marital property in a "community property" state is treated as "community property," except for "separate property" that has not been commingled. 8 When the investor owns or retains "community property" his incentive to invest in or retain equity is relatively stronger than for individual ownership in non-community property situations due to the reset at death being fully triggered by either of two separate deaths. 9 If an individual owns both "community" and "separate" property (see footnote 8), then the individual would skew his risky holdings to the "community" property, if it were not costly to do so.
The "Credit Shelter" Trust
One of the basic and most widely used estate--planning tools is the "credit shelter" trust in which individuals set aside assets in a trust (that will remain outside their spouse's estate) rather than directly bequeathing them to their spouse (note that there is an unlimited exemption for transfers to a spouse) in order to more fully utilize the combined estate tax exemption for both individuals to transfer assets to subsequent generations (if all of the assets were gifted or bequeathed directly to the spouse, then the estate tax exemption available at the first death would not be utilized to ultimately transfer assets to 7 We thank Eleanor Blayney and Bart Francis for identifying to us situations in which the basis of jointly--held property is reset to the full market value at the initial death. 8 "Separate property" can arise due to inheritances or property owned prior to the marriage. 9 We can utilize the setting in Dammon, Spatt and Zhang (2001a) to compare the effect of "community property" treatment upon the equity allocation assuming complete reset of the bases of all of a couple's taxable assets when the first spouse dies (compared to the situation with a single life examined in Dammon, Spatt and Zhang (2001a) ). Then the relevant mortality curve would be that characterizing the first death in a couple. The resulting increase in the probability of the reset of the tax bases at a point in time implies that the demand for equity would be higher in community property contexts.
the next generation). Typically, the surviving spouse becomes the "income beneficiary"
of the trust and the children of the couple ultimately receive the "principal." This structure can arise in various ways including through a revocable trust created during the grantor's lifetime or under the terms of the grantor's WILL (and not funded until death).
While lawyers often recommend the use of these trusts (it is perhaps the most basic estate--planning t ool), financial theory provides considerable (and previously unanalyzed) guidance about the optimal investment and distribution policies for these trusts.
Typically, the surviving spouse would own funds directly in addition to his role as a beneficiary of the credit shelter trust. For simplicity, we will assume that the surviving spouse is making the decisions for the trust. Huang (2000) examine the efficient asset location policy for an investor investing taxable and tax-deferred funds. We will abstract from the presence of a tax-deferred account to highlight the portfolio differences between the personal (taxable) account and the credit shelter trust. We also assume throughout our discussion that the investor's beneficiaries and those of the credit shelter trust coincide to avoid differences in preferences distorting the location or distribution decisions and rely upon arbitrage reasoning to reach our conclusions.
To examine the differences in optimal investment (and distribution) policies it is useful to identify the major differences in tax treatment between the taxable personal account and the trust. Three of the main differences are that (a) the assets in the credit shelter trust have already received the benefit of the reset of the bases on the component assets at the first death and are not eligible for additional reset in the trust form, 11 (b) the credit shelter trust is potentially outside of the taxable estate of the surviving spouse and therefore not subject to estate taxes at the death of the surviving spouse and (c) the marginal income tax rates for investment returns earned by the trust and the personal taxable account can differ (the stated income tax schedule for the trust reaches the maximum tax rate of 35%
at an income level of about $9,200). We examine the implications of these differences for the trust's optimal decisions.
The differences in tax environment for the credit shelter trust and the personal taxable account are important for understanding the optimal location of risks between these capacities. Under the assumption that the investor's personal account will ultimately be subject to estate taxes (at the margin), unlike the credit shelter trust, this suggests that the investor regards the government as owning a portion of the personal account to reflect these estate taxes.
important because of the lack of implicit co-ownership by the estate taxing authority).
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After adjusting the effective exposure for the rescaling, under a constant marginal estate tax the estate tax difference itself does not suggest systematic differences in the asset allocation policy between the personal and credit shelter accounts.
14 Another important difference is the lack of opportunity for reset of the capital gains basis in the credit shelter account, unlike for the personal account of the surviving spouse. As a result, equity is relatively more attractive to hold in the personal account, especially when the investor's life expectancy is limited and the embedded capital gains are relatively large so that it would be much more valuable for the elderly to defer the realization of gains in their personal account (to benefit from the potential impending reset of the tax basis). To the extent that there are income tax rates differences between the investor's taxable account and the credit shelter trust account, the higher rate account should hold relatively more equity and less bonds than the lower rate account. This reflects the potential deferral of capital gains and the preferential tax rate applied to long-term capital gains and dividends. If the credit shelter account has a higher tax rate than the personal account due to the rate schedule facing trusts increasing to the maximum rate at very low income levels, the rate effect works in the opposite direction from the pure reset effect described above. These clientele (arbitrage) arguments are in the spirit of the analysis of the investment holdings in the taxable vs. tax-deferred account in Dammon, Spatt and 13 An analogous issue about relative scaling of the accounts arises in the treatment of tax-deferred wealth relative to taxable wealth in Dammon, Spatt and Zhang (2004) . 14 In our analysis we assume that the estate (and income tax) rates are constants. However, the progressively of the actual estate tax schedule suggests a potential reason that elderly investors may not find it optimal to add equity exposure as they age as additional risk increases the investor's expected estate tax in some circumstances due to progressivity. Of course, this argument would not apply if the investor's marginal estate tax rate would be unaltered by the various asset allocations policies being considered, i.e., if the marginal estate tax rate were constant.
Zhang (2004) and Huang (2000) . Of course, the clientele arguments about asset location in the credit shelter trust and personal account here also can be extended to incorporate tax-deferred investing.
The optimal distribution policy by the credit shelter trust also can be addressed. Because the scheduled income tax rates can be higher for the trust than individual investors (as the trust reaches the maximum tax bracket of 35% at an income level of about $9,200), it is sometimes believed that it is optimal to pay the income tax at the individual level if the individual's marginal tax rate is below that of the trust. However, this ignores the requirement that the income be distributed to the beneficiary if the tax is to be paid at the personal level. If the beneficiary faces potential estate taxes at his own death, then an important cost to consider is the increase in estate taxes that results from the distribution of the after-income tax payoff to the beneficiary. Given the high federal estate tax rates, starting at 37% in practice, distribution of the trust's income would not be optimal for a beneficiary who would face future estate taxes with sufficiently high likelihood as the combined income tax and estate tax for the beneficiary would far exceed the income tax on trust income. 15 Of course, if the income is not distributed from the trust, there is no corresponding estate tax cost because the trust itself is outside the beneficiary's taxable estate. One important implication of this analysis for the institutional design of the credit shelter trust is that it is important for the trust document to provide the trustees the option 15 In contrast, if the beneficiary knew that his estate would not be subject to any (e.g., federal or state) estate taxes, then distribution of the trust's income would be valuable in order to own more assets personally in order to benefit from the reset of the tax basis at the beneficiary's own death. Assuming identical ordinary income tax treatments, the investor's optimal distribution (or initial contribution) decision reflects the tradeoff between the anticipated reset benefits vs. the incremental estate taxes at the beneficiary's future death. This tradeoff will be influenced by such variables as the size of the beneficiary's estate and her age. The issue of distributing trust income also illustrates how repeal of the federal estate tax would alter optimal tradeoffs in estate planning.
not to distribute income to the surviving spouse (and potentially allow the funds to grow within the trust rather than requiring their distribution). The argument for a flexible distribution policy is not simply the general observation that flexibility (options) is valuable in principle, but more specifically the desire to maximize the funds outside the estate of the surviving spouse if there is a significant likelihood that the surviving spouse will be subject to federal estate taxation at his own death, i.e., the option to retain funds in the trust is often in-the-money.
A disadvantage of bequeathing assets to a credit shelter trust is that when the income beneficiary (surviving spouse) dies there would not be an additional reset of the tax basis at that juncture. Consequently, the investor's decision about the extent to which he should bequeath assets to the credit shelter trust would be determined by the tradeoff between the anticipated estate and capital gains taxes at the survivor's death. 16 As a result of the progressivity of the estate tax schedule, including the initial estate tax exemption, investors with relatively small estates could elect not to use the credit shelter trust or allocate only a small proportion of their assets to it (this is in addition to the liquidity disadvantage of the credit shelter trust for an investor with moderate new worth). For example, if a couple were sure that its combined estate would be below the estate tax exemption, then a direct spousal bequest would provide a second reset of the tax bases at the survivor's death. A decision to change the titling of individual assets is a low-cost way (e.g., without redrafting the investor's WILL) to alter the usage of the credit shelter trust as a consequence of the tradeoff being made between anticipated capital gains and estate taxes as the investor's net worth changes. By designating the credit shelter trust as a contingent beneficiary to whom the surviving spouse can "disclaim" some of the bequest would be an even more direct way to optimize the tradeoff after death. 17 The nature of the aggregate tradeoff between estate taxes and capital gains taxes is illustrated by the earlier observation that the revenue from federal estate taxes is less than the revenue that would be generated by the taxation of capital gains at death.
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A standard feature of many credit shelter trusts gives the beneficiary the option to withdraw up to 5% of the principal (or $5,000, if greater) each year (unexercised options do not cumulate) in addition to the right to withdraw the income as well as principal for "health, welfare, maintenance and support." An adverse consequence of the "5% option"
is that 5% of the trust is added to the beneficiary's estate when he dies if the option had not been utilized in the final year of the beneficiary's lifetime (as the "option" was available at the time of death!). As a result, this option, unlike most options, is not innocuous and in light of the potential opportunity to borrow from the trust as well as the right to withdraw the trust's entire income and its principal for restricted purposes, many trusts (or the WILLS that create them) would benefit from dropping the provision! Of course, footnote 15 points to a situation in which greater opportunity to distribute assets from the trust could be beneficial. However, greater benefit of the reset of the tax basis at a beneficiary's death could be obtained by the beneficiary's borrowing from the trust without a formal distribution from the trust that would increase the size of the taxable 17 In various estate planning contexts a source of value often arises from a design in which the trustee possesses flexibility and can substantially delay decisions, providing for a valuable look-back option. 18 Interestingly, in Canada there is no estate tax, but capital gains taxes become due at death. This suggests a stronger incentive for those with long remaining life expectancies to hold highly appreciated assets rather than those with modest life expectancies (there is the opposite incentive in the United States).
estate. An alternative solution to the estate tax problem created by the "5% option" is to make the option available only on the last day of the year (as suggested by Weinstock (1995)). As long as the individual does not die on that day, there is no estate tax cost under this alternative.
Value of Tax-Deferred Investing
Dammon, Spatt and Zhang (2004) present an analysis of the relative value of tax-deferred vs. taxable wealth and the investment allocation within these accounts. They document substantial value to tax-deferred as compared to taxable wealth. These values are functions of the state variables including the split between taxable and tax-deferred wealth and the investor's age and associated mortality risks. They were computed under the assumption that the tax-deferral opportunity terminated at the investor's death. Under current IRS withdrawal regulations, the permitted withdrawals extend significantly beyond the lifetime of the original tax-deferred accountholder for all choices of beneficiary. 19 This substantially raises the relative value of tax-deferred funds (and therefore, the incentive to contribute to tax-deferred accounts).
Recently, there also has been considerable attention to "Roth" IRAs in which the income tax obligation is prepaid. Under the assumption of constant tax rates and the ability to pay the tax obligation with personal (taxable) funds, the prepayment of the income tax with personal funds for the "Roth" IRA scales up the effective tax-deferred investment. 19 The impact of the choice of beneficiary upon the required withdrawals is less than under the prior IRS rules for distributions from tax-deferred accounts, but still can be substantial. For example, by bequesting retirement funds to children can result in lower required distributions than if an elderly spouse is the beneficiary. If the elderly spouse has adequate financial resources, it may be advantageous to do so.
Among additional advantages of the "Roth" IRA are that withdrawals are not required during the investor's lifetime (in contrast, required withdrawals start at age 70.5 for the traditional tax-deferred accounts), and the 10% penalty on premature withdrawals only applies to the after-tax value.
There also is an interesting option for investors who convert a traditional IRA into a Roth IRA, i.e., the investor can re-characterize (reverse) the conversion. In particular, since the tax liability is computed based upon the conversion value, it can be optimal to reverse the conversion if the account value has declined substantially prior to October 15 th in the next year. This also suggests that until the re-characterization option expires (or otherwise has little value) it can be valuable to locate volatile assets (and especially a highly concentrated portfolio) in a tax-deferred account, unlike the focus of the location analysis in Dammon, Spatt and Zhang (2004) and Huang (2000) in generic tax-deferred settings.
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Similarly, eligible participants can recharacterize a newly funded traditional IRA as a Roth IRA and a Roth IRA as a traditional IRA until October 15 th of the year after the contribution. To maximize the option value it is advantageous to separate these accounts by their respective expiration dates (for example, managing separate accounts in which the option to recharacterize expires on October 15 th of the current year, October 15 th of the following year, and the option is no longer ava ilable).
The Role of Borrowing in Estate Planning
20 The special tax treatment for employer stock held in 401k plans also alters the conventional asset location advice.
Of course, the optimal policy for distributing trust income can depend upon the beneficiary's intertemporal consumption preferences. For example, the beneficiary may desire the funding to support his optimal intertemporal consumption policy when he faces liquidity constraints. However, to the extent that the beneficiary can borrow from the credit shelter trust his optimal consumption profile can be achieved (without distribution of trust income) because the borrowing would not result in any tax liability and could (eventually) be repaid (e.g., even if by the beneficiary's estate). Borrowing allows the beneficiary to utilize the resources of the trust (if needed) without distributing the funds to his own taxable estate.
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This discussion of the income distribution policy of the credit shelter trust points to the broader potential significance of borrowing in estate planning. Borrowing can help economic agents achieve their optimal consumption and risk-sharing strategy, while minimizing the tax liabilities that they face. In the "credit shelter" situation borrowing allows the beneficiary to minimize the estate taxes that his own heirs incur by minimizing the need to distribute funds from the trust for which he is the beneficiary to his own taxable estate. Another commonly--used device in estate planning is a limited partnership to create minority interests and associated valuation discounts (which have the effect of decreasing the effective estate tax rate and increasing the effective estate tax exemption) on the relevant assets. 22 The investor using this device typically becomes the general 21 Notice that the optimal borrowing from the trust typically would not correspond to the amount of the undistributed after-tax income earned by the trust. Also note that the ability of the trust to borrow would reflect the collateralized value of its financial assets. 22 The limited partnership approach is sometimes recommended, as the "next step" in planning for an estate that would face estate tax liability despite using a credit shelter trust structure. Poterba and Weisbenner (2003) discuss differences in effective taxation rates across asset categories.
partner, retaining control of the assets. The ability of the general partner to borrow for his personal account against these assets enhances the value of this traditional estateplanning tool.
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It avoids potential liquidity costs to the investor/general partner associated with the partnership form, even on lifetime gifts to others by the investor.
24
These arguments highlight the advantages of making sure that partnership and credit shelter documents allow the option of borrowing.
Dammon, Spatt and Zhang (2001a) point out that borrowing by an elderly investor with substantial holdings of appreciated stock would allow the i nvestor to avoid realizing gains in order to consume, as the investor's tax basis would be "stepped up" to the current market value at death. In that situation the investor would borrow to consume after selling his entire risk-free bond position and any risky assets with losses, thereby avoiding the need to sell highly appreciated securities to consume. Therefore, the ability to borrow facilitates the investor's ability to avoid capital gains taxes efficiently.
Similarly, the ability to borrow may allow the investor the opportunity to become better diversified in his portfolio structure despite the presence of substantial appreciated positions, while limiting the sale of the appreciated securities and the associated payment of capital gains taxes.
25 23 The ability to borrow allows the general partner access to the partnership funds for his consumption needs despite obtaining the benefit of the valuation discount (on both shares that he will bequest at his death as well as assets that he had previously gifted as partnership shares in his lifetime). 24 The liquidity costs to the limited partners (as well as the general partner) can be mitigated if the partnership provides them loans as needed (e.g., in the case of the limited partners up to the amount that would have otherwise been gifted to them outright). 25 Since the benefit of the "step up" in basis arises only for assets titled to individuals (but not trusts), it also can be beneficial to borrow from a related credit shelter trust to enhance this benefit.
Dammon, Spatt and Zhang (2004) observe that borrowing by an investor with a substantial tax-deferred retirement account can allow the investor to maximize the "taxarbitrage" profits available from purchasing bonds in the tax-deferred account. In fact, if the inve stor can borrow without frictions then the optimal portfolio composition is for the investor to own all of his desired equity in the taxable account, leveraging if necessary, and neutralizing the leverage through bond holdings in the tax-deferred account (see Dammon, Spatt and Zhang (2004) and Huang (2000)). 26 The ability to borrow (without substantial frictions) in the taxable account eliminates the role of equity in the taxdeferred account as well as the liquidity problems created when a substantial portion of the investor's wealth is tax deferred. In contrast, when the investor is unable to borrow in his taxable account, the investor may purchase equity in his tax-deferred account due to the constraint limiting his ownership of equity in the taxable account (see Figures 1 and 2 in Dammon, Spatt and Zhang ((2004) ).
Concluding Comments
In revising the paper we plan to use numerical solutions (extending the approach in Dammon, Spatt and Zhang (2001a) ) to examine the relative values of the reset option in situations in which there is a single investor vs. a married couple using joint ownership, assuming either 100% reset of the basis at the first death or reset to the blended basis, averaging the surviving spouse's cost and the market value at death. These solutions will allow us to further examine how individual ownership influences the pattern of holdings and investor welfare relative to joint ownership and how substantial skewness in 26 Notice that the borrowing occurs in the investor's taxable account. The analysis is not sensitive to the statutory restriction that bars or greatly restricts borrowing in tax-deferred retirement accounts.
mortality risks between the couple influences the location of risk exposures. In the analysis of the "credit shelter trust" we plan to quantify (as a function of the investor's age and other state variables) how the absence of the reset option influences the relative investment decisions in the credit shelter trust account vs. the individual's own taxable account (which includes the reset option) and the welfare benefit associated with the reset option over the state space. These comparisons require explicit numerical solution over the entire state space. Because estate planning issues are much more important for elderly (as compared to younger) investors, it will be natural to focus these solutions upon the retirement years, avoiding the need for explicit specification of the labor income generating process. In addition, we plan to quantify how the recent changes in IRS distribution rules for tax-deferred accounts enhance the value of tax-deferred wealth and how the value of Roth vs. traditional tax-deferred funds differ due to the lower effective penalty on withdrawals and lower required withdrawals. It also would be interesting to compare the predictions of this analysis with respect to asset titling and asset location to observed investor behavior.
This paper addresses an important step in developing prescriptive models of how investor should structure their holdings in realistic settings, i.e., examining both traditional and novel estate planning approaches through the theoretical lens of analyses of diversification and taxes.
